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Abstract 
This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using 
establishment-wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the 
union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis-à-vis the 
corresponding counterfactual groups. It is reported that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent 
after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective 
agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs little influences these net findings, 
although such establishments record wage losses – statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 
percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new 
indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter 
al., is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.  
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1. Introduction  
The issue of the impact of institutions on wages, including unions and collective bargaining, has 
long been of interest in Germany as in other nations. Historically, that interest has focused on 
the covariation of institutions and macroeconomic outcomes; specifically, the relation between 
bargaining structure and wage inflation and unemployment, often addressed in a comparative 
context (see, respectively, Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999; Nickel et al., 2005). Altogether less 
interest has been accorded the effects of collective bargaining on individual wages or on wage 
dispersion. This differential research emphasis in part reflects data availability – namely, the 
absence until comparatively recently of good employer-employee linked data, especially those 
with a longitudinal capacity – and partly the distinctive nature of collective bargaining in 
Germany. 
Arguably, the latter reason was more potent. Collective bargaining in Germany differs 
markedly from the Anglo-Saxon model. Sectoral or industry-level collective agreements 
between the relevant union and employers’ association (Flächentarifverträge) have until 
recently been the uncontested norm. Under such (relatively centralized) agreements, 
collectively bargained wages and conditions are typically generalized to non-union members in 
covered firms, as constitutional considerations rule out discrimination between union members 
and non-members. In these circumstances, we may speak of a coverage effect resulting from 
membership of an employer’s association that is party to the collective bargaining contract at 
industry/regional level.1 Another distinctive facet of the German industrial relations 
architecture is that collective agreements can also be declared generally binding (i.e. to non-
member firms and their employees) via an extension order (Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung) 
issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs under article 5 of the 1949 Collective 
Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz).2 Moreover, there is also a policy of ‘orientation’ in 
Germany, namely, the professed tendency on the part of firms practicing individual (as opposed 
to collective) bargaining to ‘align‘ the terms of their workers’ contracts with those set under 
sectoral agreements, with the suggestion that the coverage of sectoral bargaining in Germany is 
understated. Taken in conjunction with the facts of historically high coverage, such phenomena 
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not unnaturally directed research away from examination of a union contract differential. 
Vulgo: why compute the coverage premium when all workers are covered? 
But times have changed. The distinguishing characteristic of German industrial relations 
in recent years has been the pronounced decline in sectoral bargaining. For example, between 
2000 and 2008, sectoral bargaining coverage as a share of all establishments (employment) fell 
from 47.3 (57.3) percent to 35.4 (48.1) percent. Meantime, the share of uncovered 
establishments (employment) rose from 50.1 (35.9) percent to 61.9 (44.2) percent (Addison et 
al., 2012a).3 This erosion has in turn served to redirect attention towards an examination of 
union wage effects. By the same token, there has also occurred a continuing decline in 
extension agreements from around 2.9 percent of all primary agreements in 2000 to 1.5 
percent in 2008. And while there has been some increase in orientation with the growth of the 
bargaining-free sector, there is no suggestion either in terms of frequency or remuneration that 
the degree of ‘compensation’ is other than partial (Addison et al., 2012b). Both tendencies have 
further stimulated research interest in estimating contract differentials.  
German workers can also be covered by firm-level agreements that are typically 
negotiated by the relevant industry union and the individual employer. Such agreements do of 
course more readily conform to the Anglo-Saxon pattern, and they expanded significantly in the 
1990s (Hassel, 1999). Since then, however, their growth has faltered and today – again in 
weighted terms – such agreements are found in just 2.7 percent of establishments, accounting 
for some 7.7 percent of employment (Addison et al., 2012a). In the present treatment, and very 
pragmatically, we will aggregate over both types of collective agreement, sectoral and firm-
level. But note that firm-level contracts may be expected to yield a coverage premium of a 
roughly similar order of magnitude, not least because they may involve the mutually-agreed 
application of existing union contracts at industry level. In similar vein, the increasingly 
decentralized nature of sectoral bargaining in recent years, associated with formally recognized 
(as well as illegal) deviations from the ruling industry-level agreement (see, inter al., Bispinck, 
2004; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005), might suggest that the distinction between sectoral and 
firm-level bargaining has become increasingly blurred. Both arguments inform our pragmatic 
treatment of collective bargaining as a composite. 
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Our longitudinal (unbalanced) firm-level data is extracted from the IAB establishment 
panel (IAB-Betriebspanel). We emphasize that the use of these data for the present exercise is 
novel. After all, there are other German data sets offering matched employer-employee 
information. The sister IAB linked employer-employee data set, or LIAB, for example combines 
data from the IAB and the Employment Register, while the German Structure of Earnings (GSES 
or Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung) survey not only contains information on firm-level 
bargaining coverage but also on that of each individual worker (though not on union 
membership, which has to be estimated from other data sets such as the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP or Sozio-ökonomisches Panel). But neither data set is without blemish. 
In the case of the LIAB (and IABS which is a 2 percent sample of social security records), for 
example, the wage data are right censored at the highest level of earnings that are subject to 
social security contributions. The result is that studies often omit censored wage data – rather 
than seeking to impute them using a Tobit regression – thereby losing roughly one-eighth of the 
observations (e.g. Gartner et al., 2010). On the other hand, there are insufficient cases of 
individual worker mobility among sample establishments in the LIAB to permit the separate 
identification of unobserved individual and establishment-specific effects. For its part, the GSES 
has the advantages that hours of work are reported while earnings are not subject to 
truncation. That said, the GSES is a cross sectional data set and has no longitudinal capacity 
permitting the researcher to control directly for unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
thereby facilitating the identification of causal relationships. 
The main goal of this study is to obtain indicative and updated estimates of the coverage 
premium that control for firm fixed effects and selection. The exercise is carried out using 
techniques that include matching models and separate samples of collective bargaining leavers 
and joiners and their corresponding counterfactual groups, against the backdrop of 
considerable flux in German labor institutions. In the process, despite the number of 
treatments, we obtain estimates of the adjusted union wage gap that fall within a narrow 
range. Moreover, such deviations as we observe for a mass layoff subsample of the data appear 
reasonable.  
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2. Background Literature  
2.1 German Studies 
Modern studies of the collective bargaining premium in Germany have used the administrative 
data sets noted above, namely the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) or the linked-
employer-employer data set of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB) sometimes 
augmented by the IAB Employment Samples (IABS).4 Of the two main data sets, analyses of the 
GSES have been the more common.  
A useful starting point is the multi-level analysis of Stephan and Gerlach (2005), using 
linked employer-employee data for a regional subsample (Lower Saxony) of GSES firms in three 
separate cross sections for 1990, 1995, 2001. Results are reported for the impact of collective 
agreements on the hourly wage of an average worker employed in an average firm. In 1990 had 
that worker worked in an otherwise average firm, application of a sectoral (firm-level) 
agreement would have elevated the wage by 4 (3) percent. And somewhat higher returns to 
collective bargaining coverage are reported for the later sample years: 9 (12) percent in 1995 
and 7 (11) percent in 2001. Stephan and Gerlach also report that the firm-specific rates of 
return to human capital are lower in firms with collective agreements than in companies with 
individual contracts in two out of three cross sections while the gender wage gap is lower than 
under individual bargaining throughout.5 
 Heinbach and Spindler (2007) take a different approach to the wage gap in analyzing the 
1995 and 2001 waves of the GSES. They apply the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique to 
analyze differences in mean log hourly wages between covered and uncovered workers. 
Specifically, the authors estimate how much of the total log wage difference (€1.15 or 0.143 log 
points in 1995 and €1.20 or 0.182 log points in 2001) can be explained by characteristics (the 
selection effect) and how much by coefficients (the bargaining or coverage effect) for three 
earnings regression specifications, where the first and most parsimonious model includes only 
human capital variables. It is found that the more parsimonious the specification, the more 
important is the characteristics or selection effect. That said, most of the increase in the total 
wage gap in 2001 is mainly explained by the bargaining effect.6 
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In addition to measuring coverage effects at firm level, the penultimate GSES study 
reviewed here also allows for individual coverage and union density, the latter being imputed 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel.7 Using data from the 2001 GSES, Fitzenberger et al.‘s 
(2008) OLS results indicate that firms that follow a collective agreement pay higher wages on 
average; specifically, the greater the share of workers in a firm covered by a collective contract, 
the higher are wages on average. The effects are somewhat larger for firm-level than sectoral 
agreements. But individuals subject to a collective agreement earn less cet. par. And the 
interaction effect with firm coverage is negative, so that on average a covered worker earns 
less than his/her uncovered counterpart in the same firm. That said, the effect of increasing 
firm coverage is positive for both types of individuals, it is just more positive for uncovered 
individuals who tend to be the more successful workers in the firm and tend not to be 
unionized. For its part, although union density (in the bargaining region) serves independently 
to lower wages, increases in density reduce or actually negate the negative effect of being a 
covered individual in a covered firm while reinforcing the positive effects of coverage at firm 
level. Finally, the individual bargaining coverage result has implications for the wage 
distribution, and one that receives support from the authors’ separate quantile regression 
analysis; that is to say, the negative effect of individual coverage is stronger at higher quantiles 
of the conditional distribution (see also Burda et al., 2009).  
Of the GSES studies, only Antonczyk (2010) attempts to estimate the causal effect of 
(sectoral) collective bargaining on the wage structure for 2001, making use of two instrumental 
variables measured at district level – specifically, religious affiliation and union density. 
Antonczyk reports the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATET) for the level of wages, where the former is the expected gain from coverage of a 
randomly assigned individual with a given set of observable characteristics, and the latter is the 
idiosyncratic gain for the individual receiving the treatment. (He also investigates the effect of 
collective bargaining on wage inequality using pairwise matching.) Antonczyk’s initial OLS 
regression of log wages on a dummy variable indicating whether an employee works in an 
establishment applying a collective agreement, suggests that wages for the treated are on 
average 7.3 log points higher than for the untreated. After controlling for the higher tenure of 
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covered employees and the larger size of their employment unit, inter al., the coverage 
premium shrinks to 3.6 log points, pointing to positive selection into treatment based on 
observables. In turn, the ATE estimate or union wage effect is just 0.8 log points, while the ATET 
estimate is 1.6 log points. It is therefore concluded that individuals undergoing treatment have 
higher unobserved productivity and that they also profit from treatment (i.e. the idiosyncratic 
gains implied by the positive gap between the ATET and the ATE). Finally, Antonczyk reports 
that the small measured union effect on the wage level is consistent with a material effect on 
wage compression. 
 Studies using the LIAB are altogether less numerous and have been less concerned with 
distribution, with the principal exception of the influential contribution by Dustmann et al. 
(2009) that investigates various explanations for the growth in German wage inequality in the 
1990s.8 The most relevant LIAB study is by Gürtzgen (2007), using 1995-2002 data for mining 
and manufacturing establishments. Gürtzgen distinguishes between sectoral and firm-level 
bargaining for which the raw (real gross daily) wage differentials are 0.160 and 0.206 log points, 
respectively. After controlling for individual and establishment characteristics (e.g. the capital-
labor ratio, per capita quasi-rents, and the presence of a works council) plus dummies for 
industry, region and time, the corresponding differentials are 0.045 and 0.074. These values rise 
somewhat – to 0.081 and 0.119 log points, respectively – once the contract arguments are 
interacted with all other RHS variables. These figures are for western Germany. The 
corresponding differentials for eastern Germany are 0.316 and 0.185, 0.131 and 0.051, and 
0.068 and 0.009, respectively.  
But Gürtzgen’s interest lies in providing selectivity-adjusted estimates, controlling for 
the non-random selection of workers with unobservable skills and firms with unobservable 
attributes into the various contractual regimes. Insufficient switching of workers between firms 
in the sample does not allow her to identify the component contributions of unobserved 
worker and firm heterogeneity. Accordingly, her spell-differenced specification provides 
differentials net of both effects. Her estimates indicate an industry-level coverage premium in 
western (eastern) Germany of 0.023 (0.002), where the latter estimate is statistically 
insignificant. For its part, the firm-level premium shrinks in western Germany to -0.003 while 
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rising to 0.020 in eastern Germany, and where this time the former estimate is statistically 
insignificant. Unlike studies using the GSES, however, there is no evidence from the spell-
differenced regression (as opposed to the pooled OLS) that collective bargaining has much 
effect on the returns to observed worker attributes. The bottom line, therefore, is that there 
appears to be a small but statistically significant wage premium of around 2 percent for 
industry-level contracts in western Germany and a similar sized premium for firm-level 
contracts in eastern Germany.9  
In sum, the extant literature presents an interesting series of snapshots as to the impact 
of collective bargaining on wages (and the wage structure) as of circa 2000.10 There is every 
indication of a positive union coverage differential at this time, albeit likely well short of some 
of the initial GSES estimates. But the issue of the scale of the union premium is necessarily 
clouded both by profound changes in German industrial relations, namely the continuing 
decline in unionism and collective bargaining coverage since 2000, and by issues of causality. 
But before presenting our own updated estimates it is useful to contrast the German literature 
with U.S. findings. This will serve to underscore that the unsettled nature of estimates of the 
union wage gap is not confined to Germany, while also providing updated estimates based on 
plant-wide averages, albeit based on quasi-experimental methods. 
 
2.2 U.S. Studies 
Until very recently U.S. research has largely focused on estimating the effect of unionism using 
individual data. Such research has typically considered the effects of membership on wages.11 A 
broad consensus – at least until most recently (see below) – has been an estimate of the union 
premium of around 15 percent, much higher than German estimates reviewed earlier.  
Cross section estimates of the union gap have treated union membership status as 
either endogenous or exogenous. Studies using the former approach have attracted 
considerable controversy; initially because of the tremendous variation in estimates of the 
wage premium (e.g. Lewis, 1986; Hirsch and Addison, 1987: 123-127), and subsequently 
because of the difficulty of identifying the selection model/appropriate instruments for union 
status (Hirsch, 2004: 237-238). Such models are discussed in detail by Hirsch (2004: 238-241). 
Much of the research reflects U.S. data preoccupations associated with match bias in the 
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imputation of earnings in the principal data set available to researchers – the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) – and reporting error resulting from the misclassification of union 
status. Hirsch’s research in particular indicates that these two biases serve to materially lower 
estimates of the union premium (e.g. Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004).12 They furthermore 
dominate any tendency toward diminution of the union wage premium through time. In short, 
there is little indication from such studies of any substantive narrowing in a union markup of 
around 15 percent on average (see also Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004).  
Longitudinal analysis of the union premium is concerned with the correlation between 
unmeasured skill and union status which, if positive, will yield upwardly biased estimates of the 
union premium.13 The U.S. debate has centered on whether unionized workers are likely to be 
systematically more or less skilled than nonunion labor. Here, there are two opposing 
influences. On the one hand, in being able to select from a queue for union jobs firms can avoid 
hiring workers in the lower tail of the distribution. On the other, workers from the opposite tail 
are unlikely to be in the queue because of wage compression.14 Studies identifying a union 
wage effect from the wage change of individuals that switch union status – thereby controlling 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity, assuming that changes in status are exogenous – yield 
lower estimates of the union premium than those based on wage levels. But misclassification 
bias is a long-recognized issue here because although misclassification rates are small, so too is 
the incidence of switching. After correction for misclassification, a number of studies conclude 
that longitudinal estimates do not indicate that omitted ability bias has more than a rather 
modest impact on estimates of the union age gap (see, for example, Freeman, 1984; Card, 
1996).15 
More recent analyses of representation elections in the United States perhaps bear 
closer correspondence with the German literature. The starting point is DiNardo and Lee’s 
(2004) comparison of establishments where unions became recognized by a close margin of the 
vote with those in which they barely lost, over the interval 1984-1999, employing a regression 
discontinuity methodology (see also Frandsen, 2012). That is, they estimated a discontinuity in 
the relationship between wages and the vote share at the 50 percent vote threshold, where 
evidence of a discontinuous relation between the vote share and wages is deemed to be the 
9 
 
 
 
causal impact of unionization by eliminating any confounding selection and omitted variable 
biases. DiNardo and Lee reported small and mostly negative union wage effects – the largest 
positive wage effect within two standard errors of the point estimate being just 0.014. They 
also attempted to compute any union threat effect on wages using an event-study approach for 
those elections where unions lost and failed to gain recognition. Wages were relatively stable in 
the pre-election period and for up to 11 years after the election (where a 3 percent increase by 
year 3 could be ruled out). DiNardo and Lee explained their results as reflecting the (omitted) 
role of unobserved firm heterogeneity in studies using individual data.16 
The study of Lee and Mas (2012) follows the much longer event-study tradition (e.g. 
Ruback and Zimmermann, 1984) and examines the effect of new unionization on publicly-
traded firm’s equity value, 1961-1999. The authors use a long panel – of up to 4 years before 
and after the representation election – of high frequency data on stock market returns for each 
firm in the sample. The event-study analysis revealed substantial losses in market value 
following a union election of $40,500 per unionized worker, which value is equated with a 
union premium of around 10 percent. The cumulative average returns of firms are found to be 
close to the benchmark portfolios matched on a firm’s characteristics up to an election at which 
point the actual and the benchmark returns diverge. In addition to addressing the issue of how 
equity values respond to certification elections, the authors also estimate event-study models 
for elections with varying degrees of union support. There is a negative association between 
abnormal returns and vote share. Although there is no discernible discontinuity at the 50 
percent union vote threshold, a greater than 60 percent share for example is associated with 
negative cumulative average returns in the range 20 to 30 percent. A formal regression 
discontinuity estimate of a union victory is statistically indistinguishable from zero, allowing 
these findings to be reconciled with DiNardo-Lee result without of course vindicating the 
regression discontinuity methodology.17 
In sum, the U.S. research has been preoccupied with many of the same theoretical 
concerns as the German literature, even if the empirical studies reflect distinctive industrial 
relations structures. And many of the research findings are no less settled. As a final example, 
one might take the case of earnings inequality, briefly touched upon earlier and rather less 
10 
 
 
 
commonly examined in the United States. Although on this occasion, the directional influence is 
the same – namely, an inverse correlation between unions and inequality (e.g. Card, Lemieux, 
and Riddell, 2004) – U.S. observers evince greater skepticism as to causality than their German 
counterparts (e.g. Hirsch, 2004: 256). Accordingly, there is disputation here as to what might 
happen to inequality among union workers were their unions to disappear – further 
complicating the computation of nonunion wages in the absence of unions.  
3. The Dataset and the Raw Collective Bargaining Differential 
We begin by briefly introducing the IAB Establishment Panel or Betriebspanel, a full description 
of which can be found in Fischer et al. (2009). This dataset is based on a stratified random 
sample of the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social 
insurance. Currently, the stratification has a basis in 19 industries and 10 employee size classes. 
As the Panel was set up to serve the needs of the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit), fairly detailed information on the composition of the workforce and its growth 
trajectory constitutes an important part of the Panel questionnaire. Further questions cover 
wages as well as general information on the plant including its collective bargaining status. The 
Panel was initiated for western Germany in 1993 and extended to eastern Germany in 1996. 
The unit of analysis is the establishment, although for convenience the terms 
‘establishment’ and ‘firm’ will often be used interchangeably in what follows. Our unbalanced 
establishment panel covers the 2000-2008 interval, it being decided not to use survey data 
prior to 2000 and after 2008 because of changes in industry classification. In each year we have 
approximately 7 to 8 thousand establishments, after excluding those with always less than 5 
employees, the non-for-profit sector, and agriculture. Establishments recording more than one 
change in collective bargaining status were also excluded from our sample (see section 5 
below), as were those plants whose collective bargaining status was unreported.  
Our firm-level wage variable is defined as the wage bill per full-time employee. This 
variable was obtained from three pieces of information extracted from the raw survey: first, the 
total wage bill, that is, the gross wages paid to workers, excluding social security contributions 
and holiday allowances; second, the total number of employees, excluding apprentices, 
temporary agency workers, and certain other residual categories; and, third, the number of 
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part-time workers, all such information pertaining to end-June of the corresponding year. So as 
obtain the number of full-time equivalents, we assume two part-time workers are equivalent to 
one full-time worker.18 As was noted earlier, one crucial advantage of the wage information 
contained in the nationally representative Betriebspanel is that it exactly reports the sum of all 
wages paid, without any right- or left-censoring. Nominal wages were deflated using the 
consumer price index throughout.  
Given that the Establishment Panel was designed to facilitate labor market policy, its 
information on establishment characteristics is fairly detailed. We focus on a subset of these 
characteristics, including the shares of skilled, part-time, female, and fixed-term contract 
workers, and whether or not the establishment uses up-to-date technology, is owned by 
foreigners, is individually-owned, was founded before 1990, and engages in exporting. We also 
identify whether an establishment is a part of a multi-establishment entity and if it has a works 
council present. A variable capturing future sales – whether these are expected to be stable, 
increasing, or decreasing – is also deployed. In addition to these arguments, a full set of 
industry, sector, region, and establishment-size dummy variables complete the list of 
regressors, summary statistics on which are provided in Appendix Table 1.  
(Tables 1 and 2 near here) 
Descriptive information on wages by collective agreement type is summarized in Table 
1. (The corresponding unweighted information on collective bargaining coverage is provided in 
Appendix Table 2.) Averaging over both types of collective agreement, for example, indicates a 
collective bargaining ‘premium’ of 24 percent in 2000, somewhat lower than the 35 percent 
wage gap obtaining in 2008. Since such raw premia can be expected to capture more than a 
true bargaining effect, we next condition the change in wages on the observed collective 
bargaining transitions.19 For example, in comparing the change in real wages in two consecutive 
years for the categories of collective bargaining leavers and always-members, we should expect 
the wage change of leavers to fall below that of the comparison group of always members, and 
symmetrically for joiners versus never members. This information is displayed in Table 2. In 
2000-2001, for example, the observed ratio of relative wage changes is surprisingly 1.0342 in 
favor of leavers. That is to say, leavers enjoyed larger increases than did always members. This 
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result is contrary to what one might expect, and perhaps reassuringly the wage changes 
observed in 2002-2003, 2003-2004, and 2007-2008 more closely accord with our priors. As far 
as joiners (versus never members) are concerned, switching implies higher wages than staying 
uncovered in 2003-2004 through 2007-2008. (The corresponding raw transitions into and out 
collective bargaining are given in Appendix Table 3.) While interesting, this additional 
information on the implicit wage premium is very preliminary since we are not controlling for 
anything other than the change in collective bargaining status. We should also point out that 
examining real wage changes over two-year intervals – 2000-2002, 2002-2004, etc. – did not 
present any obvious improvement in the sense that joiners more consistently gained and losers 
more consistently lost. Indeed, the evidence was quite to the contrary. Our argument thus 
remains the same: a sufficiently-specified control function is required to address the issue, 
although we shall present a separate sub-analysis based on those establishments that 
experienced mass layoffs in a further control for firm heterogeneity. 
With these preliminaries behind us we therefore turn to the formal modeling exercise.  
 
4. Econometric Modeling of the Collective Bargaining Effect on Firm Wages 
4.1 Regression Analysis (Difference-in-Differences) 
Investigation of the effects of collective bargaining status on establishment wages involves 
speculation as to how (average) wages would have developed in the absence of the institution. 
Analysis of the problem therefore requires use of the standard Roy-Rubin model of potential 
outcomes (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974). 
As a general framework, let us denote collective bargaining status by a binary variable 
    and assume that in a given year t establishment i is either covered by a collective agreement 
in which case we observe the corresponding average wage     , or it is not covered and we 
observe     . Further assuming that the outcome      is a (linear) function of a time-invariant 
unobserved individual effect   , time-specific unobserved factors   , and observed 
establishment characteristics    , where   is a vector row and   a vector column, we have 
 (    )                                                   (1) 
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Under the assumptions that the expected outcome is independent of    , conditional on 
    , 
  (                    )    (               )                               (2) 
and that the causal effect of participation is additive and constant, 
  (                )    (               )                                  (3) 
we can specify the general (unobserved effects) model as 
                                                          (4) 
where  (                 )   .  
Given that for collective agreement joiners (never members)        (      ), 
model (4) gives 
 (            )   (            ) 
    (            )   (            )   
   (by condition (2)). 
In particular, for t = 1, 2, and for the set of joiners and never members, model (4) 
becomes 
                                                               (5)  
where     is a 1/0 dummy denoting t=2 , while       for t=1, 2 if establishment i is a never 
member and       and       if i is a joiner.  
Taking then the first difference of (5), we have 
                          , 
which is equivalent to 
                                         (6) 
We have therefore the usual and important result that, at t=2, regressing      on a 
constant,     , and      one obtains the treatment effect,  ̂. Moreover, ignoring the      
term, from model (6), we obtain the difference-in-differences (DD) estimate   ̂  , as follows 
 ̂          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂   . In short, an estimate of   can ultimately be obtained by the 
difference in the average wage change between the two groups (of joiners and never 
members).20 Mutatis mutandis for leavers versus always members. All that is required here is 
14 
 
 
 
maintenance of the adequate DD assumption, or  (               )   (               ). 
This is equivalent to assuming the presence of a time-invariant individual effect in model (4).  
In our empirical analysis of the 2000-2008 period, we will estimate model (6) using 
information on two consecutive years firstly in separate regressions and, secondly, in a pooled 
manner. The latter implementation simply regresses      on a constant,     , and     , where t 
= 2, 3, …,9, while ignoring any individual (establishment) history. The pooled version of the 
conditional difference-in-differences approach next described follows a similar strategy.  
 
 4.2 Conditional Difference-in-Differences (Matching)  
Up to this point, we have obtained the effect of collective bargaining status on average wages  
after having simply entered the vector of covariates   into the unobserved effects model (4), 
the expectation being that the addition of a sufficiently large number of control variables will 
effectively purge the analysis of any correlation between unobservables and outcomes.21 In the 
next step, however, rather than relying exclusively on a parametric model and a linear function 
form we will instead construct a matching control group, and then compute the difference in 
the average outcome across participants and non-participants to estimate the effect of 
participation (namely either separate act of joining or leaving).  
The key point of the matching approach is to find, say, two units i and i’ with the same 
probability of participation conditional on   – or the same propensity score  ( ) – such that 
one unit receives treatment and the other does not. The goal is therefore to randomize 
participation ex-post by selecting two groups of establishments – such as joiners and never 
members – with, presumably, an identical probability of joining collective agreements but 
which by mere accident are not all treated in the treatment period. 
More formally, consider again the quadruple (             ), where    is the treatment 
dummy (i.e.     if i covered by a collective agreement and     if i is not covered), and     
and     are the corresponding outcomes.    is a vector of observables. Let us further assume 
firstly that  (           )   (           )   (      ) (i.e. conditional mean 
independence) and secondly that  ( )   . 
Under these assumptions the average impact of treatment on the treated (ATT) is given 
by  
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      (            )  
  { (               )     } (by iterated expectations) 
  { (          )   (           )     }  
   { (           )   (           )     } . 
Simplifying the notation, we can write 
       (       )        (7)  
Accordingly, if    is a discrete variable, we have 
  =∑       (    )      , 
where    is the treatment effect at a particular value, say     . (If, on the other hand,    is a 
continuous variable, one can use a stratification of    and work with as many groups as 
required.) 
Alternatively, one may use the propensity score function. In this case, by the propensity 
score theorem,            implies          (  ) , giving  
       (            ) 
  { (       |      (  ))     } (by iterated expectations) 
  { (          (  ))   (          (  ))     } 
  { (          (  ))   (          (  ))     }.    (8) 
Clearly,       in equation (8) resembles the average treatment effect on the treated 
(    ) in (7). Having obtained a probit or logit estimate of  (  ), one either stratifies  (  ) 
and works with a certain number of groups of treated and untreated units or one attempts to 
find for every single treated unit the corresponding propensity score matched unit, or units. If 
for some participant we have   ̂   , then the impact of treatment will have to be redefined to 
comprise only the estimated impact of the treatment on the treated for those whose 
propensity scores lie within the common support region,    ̂(  )   , discarding all those 
participants with  ̂ ( )   . But even for a participant with a score in the support region it will 
not be always possible to find a perfect non-participant with exactly the same propensity score. 
The ‘distance’ between the propensity score of, say, participant i and the propensity score of 
the matched non-participant j can be then used as a weighting factor in the differenced 
outcome (see below). 
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In this general framework, it can be shown (see Smith and Todd, 2005) that a typical 
(cross-section) matching estimator is given by 
 ̂   
   
 
  
∑       ̂       (          (  ) ,     (9) 
where  ̂(          (  )  ∑  (   )       ,    is the set of participants,    is the number of 
persons in the set       ,    being the support region,    is the set of non-participants, and 
 (   ) gives the corresponding weights that will depend on the distance between  (  ) and 
 (  ).  
However, it is probably more realistic to abandon the underlying (cross-section) 
identification assumption, that, after conditioning on  , the conditional mean independence is 
satisfied, and instead assume that a comparison between treated and matched untreated 
groups in a single year is not sufficient to capture all unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, under 
the hypothesis that not all systematic differences between participants (    ) and non-
participants (    )are captured by  , and assuming that (unobserved) characteristics are 
time-invariant, by differencing the outcomes over time one will be able to obtain an improved 
estimate of the treatment effect. Specifically, we obtain the difference in differences matching 
estimator for longitudinal data, namely 
 ̂  
   
 
  
∑ {(          )        ∑  (   )(          )       }.    (10) 
 This is an immediate extension of  ̂   
   in equation (9) above that holds under the 
appropriate DD identification hypothesis 
 (                 (  ))   (                 (  )), with     .
22   
As a first step in our matching approach, therefore, we will estimate a probit model in 
order to obtain the predicted probability of being treated,  ̂( ), where X comprises an 
extended set of covariates. Once the predicted probability is obtained, we then apply different 
matching algorithms: nearest neighbor matching with replacement, radius matching, and kernel 
matching. Nearest neighbor matching with replacement consists of choosing for a control the 
(non-participant) unit with the nearest propensity score. In Radius matching one selects for the 
control group any match within a pre-selected distance. (In our case, this distance, d, is set at d 
= 0.01 and d = 0.005.) Finally, with kernel matching almost no establishment is excluded from 
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the control group, with the corresponding weights depending on the propensity score distance. 
(See Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, for a survey of these various alternatives.) 
Since exact matching is not feasible in practice, another crucial aspect of this approach is 
to assess its quality with respect to the similarity of the two groups – and the closer the 
characteristics between treated and comparison groups the better – and the variance of the 
estimated treatment effect. As far as the quality of the match is concerned, there are two main 
alternative measures available in the literature: the standardized bias (SB) and the t-test in 
mean differences. The former takes the difference in sample (after treatment) means in the 
treated and matched control groups, standardized by the corresponding sample variances, to 
yield ( ̅   ̅ )  √((  ( ̅ )    ( ̅ ))  , where  ̅ (  ) is the mean (variance) in group j = 0, 1. 
In practice, 0.05 is often taken as the critical value, so that a successful matching will always 
imply SB<0.05. The t-test is a standard test on the null that the mean of each included covariate 
is the same across the two groups. In turn, our preferred route to estimate the variance of 
average treatment effects will be to use the method of bootstrapping, which amounts to re-
estimating the results R times and therefore to R bootstrap samples and R estimated average 
treatment effects. The distribution of these means approximates the sampling distribution of 
the population mean, which allows us then to compute the bootstrapped standard errors of the 
treatment effect. 
 
5. Results 
We focus on the private, for-profit sector and on establishments with at least five employees. 
The employment size cut-off is imposed to control for the presence of works councils – five 
employees being required to trigger the formation of a works council – and to avoid excessive 
volatility with respect to collective bargaining coverage associated with very small 
establishments.23 Further, since collective bargaining status is not always reported in the IAB 
survey (this is true for 10 percent of the cases in a given year), we consider only those units for 
which this status is always provided in two consecutive years. As a result, we lose some 20 
percent of all establishments. In short, we opted not to impute collective bargaining status in 
these missing cases. Finally, multiple switchers – otherwise includable units with more than one 
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change in status over the sample period – were also dropped from the sample. This excision 
was applied because we suspect that most such cases are the result of faulty coding. 
(Nevertheless, results based on the sample of all units including those with imputed collective 
bargaining status and those with multiple collective bargaining transitions are available from 
the authors upon request. We found no material changes in the results as a result of their 
incorporation.)  
 
5.1. Difference-in-Differences: Findings  
Table 3 presents the effect of joining a collective agreement by separate one-year transition 
periods, from 2000-2001 through 2007-2008. In panel (a) of the table, we report the results of a 
regression in which the changes in wages at establishment level are a function of a dummy 
variable denoting establishment transition status (i.e. as a joiner or never member), with all 
control variables in first differences. In panel (b) the control variables are in base-year levels. 
Table 4, which charts the effect of leaving a collective agreement versus remaining covered by 
one, is organized in similar fashion. And in the last column of each table is given the results 
from pooling the observations from all separate one-year transition samples. Here we are 
respectively comparing the wage development of joiners (leavers) versus never members 
(always covered), assuming that unobserved macro effects on wage growth that are 
presumably different in each transition period can be captured by year dummies. Again observe 
that wages are expressed in real terms throughout. 
(Tables 3 and 4 near here) 
Two main findings stand out. First, switching in or out of collective bargaining implies on 
average a change in wages of 3 to 3.5 percent, positive for joiners and negative for leavers (see 
the last columns of Tables 3 and 4). Second, with a few exceptions, the evidence based on 
separate samples scarcely provides any statistically significant effect of collective agreement 
transitions on establishment wages. This latter result turns out to be quite relevant and likely 
indicates why analysts have been unable to obtain at establishment level a robust collective 
bargaining premium using single-year transitions. Indeed, random selection of any one cell from 
the first eight columns of Table 3 or Table 4 yields either implausible estimates of the premium 
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derived from joining/leaving a collective agreement of any type or, more likely, statistically 
insignificant estimates. In short, the strategy of enlarging the sample as much as possible by 
including all joiners and leavers (and corresponding control groups) in a single, pooled sample is 
crucial.  
Our use of a relatively large set of regressors makes it more likely that a proper control 
function has been used in the difference-in-differences (OLS) regression. But whether we are 
using proper control groups can only be addressed in a matching framework.  
 
5.2. Conditional Difference-in-Differences (Matching): Findings 
Tables 5 and 6 present alternative estimates of the effects of entering into or abandoning a 
collective agreement based on propensity score matching. Note that the nearest neighbor 
results are more or less the same as those discussed below, but since the quality of the match is 
always lower we focus on the two other variants of the model. Further note that the evidence 
for separate transition periods is now omitted. In the pooled cases presented here, observe 
that the treatment group is again made up of all joiners/leavers that happen to join/leave in 
any single year, 2001-2008. For its part, the group of (matched) untreated establishments is 
made up of all units that in any two consecutive years did not switch into (out of) collective 
bargaining. By way of a caveat, since an establishment j is a joiner (leaver) after being a never 
member (always member) for some time, if j is in the observation window for more than one 
year prior to the event of joining there is a possibility that the self-same establishment might be 
at once a joiner (leaver) and a member of the control group. Having identified such cases, we 
checked the sensitivity of our results to their exclusion. We can confirm that our findings were 
not materially affected, the results being available from the authors upon request. 
(Table 5 near here) 
As is apparent, the conditional difference-in-differences estimates based on propensity 
score matching of the treated and untreated groups are strikingly close to the regression DD 
results. That is to say, the effect of joining/leaving is both symmetric and again in the 3 to 4 
percent range for the pooled case. For the kernel matching case in Table 5, we see that the 
collective bargaining premium obtained using the sample of joiners and never members lies 
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between 3.2 and 3.5 percent, very close to the DD estimates in Table 3. In turn, the estimated 
collective bargaining wage premium using leavers and always members in the second row is 
now slightly higher than before, at 3.8 percent. All wage premia are statistically significant at 
either the .01 or .05 level. 
(Table 6 near here) 
In Table 6 we present results from using a different matching algorithm, namely radius 
matching. For each sample – joiners versus never members and leavers versus always members 
– the treatement effect is again strikingly in the 3 to 4 percent range. As a peripheral issue, note 
that the radius caliper methodology is out-performed by the kernel technique in respect of 
individual year transitions as virtually none of the treatment effects is statistically significant.  
An observation on the quality of the matching between treated and untreated groups 
might usefully be added. Without exception, the mean standardized bias (the mba row in 
Tables 5 and 6) was substantially reduced after matching. This means that the difference in 
mean characteristics across treated and untreated groups has been reduced or, equivalently, 
that the groups have, after matching, approximately the same observed characteristics. 
Specifically, after matching, the mba statistic is always smaller than 5 percent in the pooled 
case.24 
Finally, we also provide the pseudo-R2 for the propensity score/probit model run after 
matching the treated and untreated groups. As in all cases the pseudo R2 statistic tends to be 
very low, it follows that after matching on (observed) firm characteristics the treatment is fairly 
at random. The LR statistic in the last row of each panel also shows that after matching we 
cannot reject the null that the set of regressors in the propensity score probit is not jointly 
statistically significant. And although not reported in Tables 5 and 6, the number of off-support 
units is always modest, never exceeding 5 percent of the total number of untreated units either 
in the case of joiners or leavers.  
 
5.3. Robustness: Results for the Subsample of Mass Layoffs 
We now examine the robustness of our results for a sub-sample of establishments in which the 
reduction in the workforce exceeded a certain threshold, deemed collective dismissals. The 
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selected threshold is based on §17 of the 1951 Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG or Employment 
Protection Act). Under this section, formal notification to the Federal Employment Agency is 
required whenever an employer plans to lay off, within a period of 30 days, (a) 5 employees for 
all establishments with more than 20 and less than 60 employees, (b) 10 percent of the 
workforce or more than 25 employees where the number of employees is at least 60 and less 
than 500, and (c) 30 or more employees if the establishment has at least 500 employees. 
Note that we do not have information on intra-annual employment changes; rather, we 
can only observe employment changes at establishment level from year t to year t+1. But using 
exactly the same estimation sample as in Tables 3 and 4, 7 percent of all collective bargaining 
leavers are flagged as mass layoffs. This compares with 11 percent among the group of always 
members. The corresponding estimates for joiners and never members are 6 percent and 4 
percent, respectively. In short, mass layoffs are roughly the same in percentage terms among 
leavers and joiners, but they are much less common among never members than for always 
members.25  
Next, we re-ran model (6). The results are presented in Table 7, but only for the pooled 
case given the limited number of annual mass layoffs yielded by our sample. Assuming that 
mass layoffs might provide a less contaminated sample – in the sense that endogenous worker 
separations are less of a problem – the results in Table 7 suggest that the wage effect of leaving 
a collective agreement is probably larger than the -3.5 percent effect found in Table 4. Indeed, 
the estimated effect for the mass layoff sample is between -8.2 and -9.9 percent (see column 
(2) of table 7). For the subsample of joiners (and never members), shown in column (1) of table 
and among whom mass layoffs were less common, the results are necessarily weaker than 
those in column (2) and we do not find any statistically significant evidence of the presence of 
any collective bargaining wage effect in this case. Furthermore, this result for joiners is not 
unexpected as short-run effects are likely to dominate: if a given establishment is laying off a 
sizeable proportion of its workforce, wage gains are unlikely over a one year horizon.  
(Table 7 near here) 
We turn in conclusion to the results of the regression exercise once we net out the mass 
layoffs. The findings are provided in the bottom half of Table 7 (net sample). They show that 
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the evidence earlier reported in Tables 3 and 4 is insensitive to the exclusion of mass layoffs. In 
other words, whenever the employment changes are not too dramatic (specifically, below the 
collective dismissals threshold), we have the key result that the wage effect of collective 
bargaining coverage is symmetric and around 3.5 percent. In this context – and given the 
relatively small number of mass layoffs in the sample and the difficulty in identifying them in 
practice – we have no strong reason to seriously question the results in Tables 3 and 4. The 
possible caveat is that whenever there is a sizeable reduction in the workforce, leaving a 
collective agreement is likely to imply a larger reduction in average wages than the benchmark 
loss of 3.5 percent indicated in Table 4. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Notwithstanding the steadily increasing number of studies seeking to determine the earnings 
impact of unionism and collective bargaining in Germany, the magnitude of the union wage 
premium is unsettled – no less so than in the United States. Be it due to the lack appropriate 
wage data, the difficulty of constructing a proper control group, or assembling a sufficient time 
series, the range of estimates of the adjusted union contract differential surveyed in section 2.1 
as of circa 2001s too wide for comfort. 
The principal goal of the present inquiry has been to derive selection-adjusted estimates 
of the effect of collective bargaining on average wages at the level of the firm, and thereby to 
inform the debate on the scale of the wage premium. That is, we have sought to obtain solid 
indicative estimates extracted from a sufficiently representative sample of the economy based 
on a comparatively long and updated time frame. 
It is fully recognized that the effect of collective bargaining on wages may be expected 
to differ across individuals and even by type of collective agreement. But there are enough 
reasons to sustain a broader focus at this stage. And that has been to provide a reasonable 
ballpark estimate of the wage gap of a covered establishment vis-à-vis its uncovered 
counterpart. To this end, we have aggregated pragmatically across two types of collective 
bargaining – sectoral and firm-level agreements – against the backdrop of the pronounced 
decline in collective bargaining as a whole. Clearly, these collective agreements differ much 
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more from individual contracts than from each other, and have arguably become closer with 
the decentralization of sectoral bargaining. 
 What are our findings? In the first place, we confirm that unionism/collective 
bargaining still attracts a wage premium. The size of the markup is in the 3 to 4 percent range. 
This estimate is well below average gains of 10 to 12 percent reported in some of the German 
cross-section literature. Technical issues apart, our results are prima facie consistent with the 
(ongoing) decline in and decentralization of collective bargaining. Secondly, we found 
symmetric effects: firms leaving collective bargaining experienced wage reductions that are 
very similar in magnitude to the wage gains recorded by joiners. Observe that this outcome was 
not imposed by any particular methodology and strengthens our central finding as to the 
magnitude of the wage gap. That said, by way of qualification, different results are found for a 
small subset of the data. Specifically, for those firms engaging in mass layoffs modest wage 
losses are experienced upon joining a collective agreement and fairly heavy losses when 
abandoning a collective agreement vis-à-vis the counterfactuals. Nevertheless, although mass 
layoffs clearly merit separate identification, netting out such establishments scarcely dented 
our central finding of a 3 to 4 percent contract premium.  
Finally, of course, the present study has looked at just one aspect of bargaining impact. 
Left open has been its effect on the wage structure. A small union premium on average might 
mean that unions have devoted more of their energies to narrowing differentials. Historically, 
there is some suggestion in the German (and U.S.) literature of strong positive effects at lower 
reaches of the wage distribution. But if the small average differential charted here is indicative 
of a reduction in union bargaining power, the narrowing process observed in earlier years may 
itself have been reversed. Investigation of this issue is an important topic for future research.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. But not of an individual union membership effect on wages, the focus of much of the Anglo- 
Saxon empirical literature. 
 
2. Other elements of extension machinery in Germany are the Posted Workers Act 
(Entsendegesetz) of 1996 and the Act on Minimum Working Conditions 
(Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz) of 1952, both of which pieces of legislation were extended 
in 2009. 
 
3. No less important has been the decline in union density. Over the same interval, union 
density fell from 24.6 percent to 19.6 percent (Bispinck et al., 2010).  
 
4. For earlier studies using the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP) that focus on changes in 
the wage structure, see OECD, 1996; Steiner and Wagner, 1998. It is widely acknowledged that 
the GSEOP measures wages with much less precision than in administrative data where 
misreporting is subject to severe penalties. 
 
5. Companion studies by Gerlach and Stephan (2006a; 2006b) also point to lower wage 
dispersion under collective than individual bargaining. See also the regional study of Bechtel et 
al. (2004). 
 
6. Heinbach and Spindler also assess the distributional effects of bargaining using quantile 
regression decomposition techniques. For both sample years it is reported for all three models 
that the bargaining effect is highest in the lower parts of groups’ wage distributions and 
decreases with increasing wages, although by 2001 the bargaining effect is reported in all parts 
of the wage distribution. In common with all other GSES studies, Heinbach and Spindler’s 
analysis suggests that bargaining reduces inequality. 
 
7. For separate studies of the union density-wage nexus, see, inter al., Fitzenberger and Kohn 
(2005); Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998). 
 
8. Up to 28 percent of the increase in inequality in the lower end of the wage distribution at this 
time is attributed to union decline. 
 
9. That said, Gürtzgen also provides an analysis of the wage consequences of transitioning 
between contract types based on trend-adjusted difference-in-difference estimators that might 
suggest that the former estimate is downwardly biased and the latter effect confounded by 
wage losses experienced by those joining sectoral agreements. 
 
10. An exception is the very recent study by Antonczyk et al., (2010) that tracks wage inequality 
up to 2006. 
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11. There is almost no U.S. work on the effects of coverage on the wage gap, not only because 
of the relatively few covered nonunion members in the Unites States but also for data reasons 
including misclassification. What evidence there is, points to a much smaller coverage than 
membership premium (e.g. Schumacher, 1999; Budd and Na, 2000), although the jury is still out 
on the causes (see Hirsch, 2004: 257-258).  
 
12. The scale of the problem is as follows, given an estimate of the union premium in 2001 of 
.13 log points using the full CPS sample comprising workers with and without imputed earnings. 
Correcting for match bias (by excluding those with imputed earnings) raises the wage premium 
to .18 log points, while correcting for misclassification bias (of just 2 percent) increases it to .24 
log points. 
 
13. In the event of a positive correlation between unmeasured skills and unionization, a 
movement from a nonunion (union) to a union (nonunion) job should entail a small wage gain 
(loss).  
 
14. See also Wessels’ (1994) argument that upgrading on the part of employers may not be 
expected on theoretical grounds. 
 
15. Hirsch (2004: 254-255) further notes that longitudinal estimates that control for skill groups 
have broadly similar union gap estimates by skill. This is the result of two opposing forces: 
positive selection at the lowest skill levels and negative section at the highest levels. After 
sorting, so the argument runs, wage effects vary little by skill group. 
 
16. They also allude to the lingering imprecision of the union treatment effect in longitudinal 
studies using household-level data where randomly chosen individuals are presumed as moving 
from a randomly chosen nonunion employer to a randomly chosen union employer. 
 
17. Note that the regression discontinuity methodology is unable to provide a counterfactual 
for the set of elections where the large majority of workers vote in favor of unionization. The 
counterfactual in the event-study approach is what would have happened in the absence of any 
representation election.  
 
18. Although there is no information in the Betriebspanel on hours worked at the individual 
(worker) level, the share of part-time workers by different categories of working hours is 
available. We experimented with various strategies for allocating part-timers and concluded 
that the rule ‘two part-timers equal one full-timer’ adequately represented these data. 
 
19. There are transitions into and out of works councils as well. But these movements are much 
less frequent and we will here simply treat works council status as an additional control 
variable. 
 
20. It follows from model (6) that  ̂         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (Wooldridge, 2002: 283-284). These results 
show a more general result that  ̂   can ultimately be obtained from a general unobserved 
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model (4), and that, for T=2 (that is, a panel with two years), first differences and difference-in-
differences yield the same estimate of the treatment effect. 
 
21. An alternative to a full set of control variables is the use of a more parsimonious equation in 
which the estimated propensity score term,  ̂ , with     (  )      (       ), is added 
to the linear regression of      on a constant,     , and       Indeed, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) advocate adding an additional term   ( ̂   ̂ ), where  ̂  is the sample average of  ̂ . 
Unfortunately, it is not obvious which approach is more appropriate (Woodridge, 2002: 619-
620). 
 
22. DD matching and pure regression DD estimates might not differ by much. For the cross-
section case, this point can be illustrated in relatively straightforward manner by setting 
         (       ), with           ,           ,     (   ), and     (   ). 
Further assuming both  (   |  ) =  (   |  ) and the conditional mean independence 
assumption, we have  (        )           (  ), with       and    (  )  
 (     ), the control function. If regression analysis explicitly requires these two assumptions 
plus additivity, matching has its own associated difficulties. Specifically, since there will be as 
many treatment effects as     s, perfect matches are not in general possible so that an explicit 
weighting rule is required. 
23. We experimented with several establishment size filters, the main issue being whether we 
should allow an establishment to fall below the minimum number of five employees at any 
time. After testing alternative rules, we implemented the restriction that establishments have 
the 5-employee minimum in at least one year in the sample period. (Results based on different 
filters are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
24. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), an mba of 20 percent is considered large, and 
one of less than 5 percent very good. 
 
25. Especially for the group of small establishments there will be an overestimation of mass 
layoffs as the Establishment Panel does not allow us to distinguish between a voluntary quit 
and an employer-initiated separation. For larger firms, however, this is less of an issue because 
it is unlikely to be the case that, say, say, a 10 percent reduction in the workforce, is largely the 
result of voluntary quits. 
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Table 1 
Real Wage Bill Per Employee (in year 2000 Euros), Unweighted Data 
 
Establishment type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Firm collective bargaining 2,170.9 2,198.6 2,329.3 2,297.9 2,387.1 2,316.1 2,433.0 2,231.9 2,133.0 
Sectoral collective bargaining 2,140.9 2,153.5 2,193.9 2,139.0 2,140.5 2,124.3 2,109.6 2,033.1 1,953.6 
Any collective bargaining 2,144.6 2,158.9 2,209.4 2,158.3 2,169.4 2,149.4 2,152.9 2,060.3 1,979.2 
No collective bargaining 
/individual bargaining 
1,733.2 1,786.5 1,827.0 1,747.2 1,692.2 1,646.0 1,620.3 1,530.5 1,469.9 
All 1,959.3 1,984.3 2,023.8 1,950.4 1,923.5 1,883.4 1,858.2 1,753.7 1,675.2 
N 7,037 7,752 7,391 7,336 7,320 7,480 7,357 7,855 8,094 
Notes: The reported figures are per full-time equivalent employee. The number of full-time equivalent 
workers is given by the sum of full-time workers plus 0.5 (part-time workers). Real wages, which 
reference the year 2000, were obtained using the inverse of the consumer price index as a deflator. See 
the text for full description of the dataset. 
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Table 2 
Real Wage Changes for Collective Bargaining Leavers Versus Always Members and Joiners 
Versus Never Members, Consecutive Years, Unweighted Data 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
(a) Leavers vis-à-vis always members  
2000 1.0342               
2001   1.0506             
2002     0.9428           
2003       0.9811         
2004         1.0300       
2005           1.0912     
2006             1.0144   
2007               0.9570 
(b) Joiners vis-à-vis never members 
2000 0.9697               
2001   0.9617             
2002     0.9456           
2003       1.0505         
2004         1.0345       
2005           1.1189     
2006             1.0356   
2007               1.0554 
Notes: See note to Table 1. The real wage change for a leaver (always member) j (j’) is given by 
              (             ), where   denotes the real wage bill per full-time equivalent employee. The 
value in each cell is obtained by dividing the two ratios; and similarly for joiners versus never members.  
The values reported in panel (a) are based on panels (a) and (c) of Appendix Table 4, while panel (b) is 
obtained using panels (b) and (d). 
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Table 3 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Joining/Entering into a Collective 
Agreement, Separate One-Year Transitions and Pooled Samples 
 
 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 POOLED 
(a) Regressors in first differences 
 ̂   0.008 0.000 -0.044 0.123*** 0.047 -0.022 0.041 0.091*** 0.035** 
t-statistic  0.228 -0.011 -0.656 2.406 0.941 -0.237 0.835 2.980 2.204 
N  1,999 2,279 2,123 1,688 2,700 2,720 2,847 3,223 19,579 
(b) Regressors in base-year levels 
 ̂   -0.,007 0.003 -0.054 0.132*** 0.053 -0.045 0.039 0.090*** 0.031*** 
t-statistic   -0.,203 0.059 -0.766 2.431 1.058 -0.462 0.804 2.805 1.869 
N  2,004 2,281 2,129 1,693 2,711 2,724 2,857 3,226 19,625 
Notes: The model specification is given by equation (6) in the text. In each column, N gives the number 
of establishments observed in the two corresponding (consecutive) years. The set of regressors includes 
all the variables described in Appendix Table 1, plus year dummies in the pooled case. In panel (a), the 
time-varying regressors are in first differences.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Leaving/Abandoning a Collective 
Agreement, Separate One-Year Transitions and Pooled Samples 
 
 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 POOLED 
(a) Regressors in first differences 
 ̂   -0.058* -0.016 -0.076** -0.076 0.017 -0.004 -0.036 -0.033 -0.035*** 
t-statistic  -1.787 -0.448 -2.095 -1.076 0.520 -0.088 -0.653 -1.433 -2.541 
N  2,351 2,481 2,253 1,610 2,389 2,233 2,149 2,204 17,670 
(b) Regressors in base-year levels 
 ̂   -0.062* -0.020 -0.063 -0.073 0.019 -0.006 -0.044 -0.033 -0.034*** 
t-statistic   -1.876 -0.559 -1.655* -1.064 0.585 -0.130 -0.803 -1.374 -2.475 
N  2,354 2,484 2,256 1,614 2,396 2,239 2,155 2,212 17,710 
Note: See notes to Table 3. 
 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Conditional Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Joining and Leaving a Collective 
Agreement, with Kernel Matching, Pooled Sample 
 
 (i) 
Regressors in first differences 
(ii) 
Regressors in base-year levels 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Collective bargaining joiners 
(Control group: never members) 
0.0345** 2.16 0.0319** 2.05 
N=19,560 
mba=0.02 
Pseudo R2=0.036 
LR=1.95 
N=19,606 
mba=3.4 
Pseudo R2=0.02 
LR=0.07 
Collective bargaining leavers 
(Control group: always members) 
-0,0380** -2,20 -0,0384*** -2,53 
N=17,650 
mba=2.10 
Pseudo R2=0.04 
LR=0.0 
N=17,690 
mba=2.18 
Pseudo R2=0.05 
LR=0.0 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. mba indicates the mean standardized (absolute) bias in percentage, while 
the pseudo-R2 and LR statistics are drawn from the propensity score regression (probit) run after 
matching the treated and untreated groups. The likelihood ratio (LR) tests the joint significance of all 
included variables in the probit regression. 
 ***, ** denote statistical significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 
Conditional Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Joining and Leaving a Collective 
Agreement, with Radius Matching (Caliper 0.01), Pooled Sample 
 
 (i) 
Regressors in first differences 
(ii) 
Regressors in base-year levels 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Collective bargaining joiners 
(Control group: never members) 
0.036** 2.26 0.033** 2.09 
N=19,560 
mba=0.79 
Pseudo R2=0.06 
LR=0.0 
N=19,606 
mba=0.91 
Pseudo R2=0.06 
LR=0.0 
Collective bargaining leavers 
(Control group: always members) 
-0.038*** -2.68 -0.036*** -2.50 
N=17,650 
mba=1.07 
Pseudo R2=0.10 
LR=0.0 
N=17,690 
mba=1.17 
Pseudo R2=0.10 
LR=0.0 
Note: See notes to Table 6. 
 ***, ** denote statistical significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Joining and Leaving a Collective 
Agreement, Pooled Samples 
 
 
Estimates of the Effect of 
Joining 
(1) 
Estimates of the Effect of 
Leaving 
(2) 
A: Sample of mass layoff establishments 
(a) Regressors in first differences 
 ̂   -0.016  -0.082* 
t-statistic  -0.278 -1.763 
N  716 1,665 
   
(b) Regressors in base-year levels 
 ̂   -0.023    -0.099** 
t-statistic   -0.365 -2.111 
N  719 1,670 
B: Net sample (i.e. all establishments except mass layoffs) 
(a) Regressors in first differences 
 ̂       0.036**      -0.032*** 
t-statistic  2.180 -2.245 
N  18,863 15,998 
(b) Regressors in base-year levels 
 ̂      0.032**     -0.031** 
t-statistic   1.897 -2.149 
N  18,906 16,033 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Full time equivalent of employees (time-varying) 163.309 947.102 
Share of females (time-varying) 0.373 0.296 
Share of skilled workers (time-varying) 0.634 0.289 
Share of part-time workers (time-varying) 0.165 0.225 
Share of fixed-term workers (time-varying) 0.042 0.111 
State of technology in use: good (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.671 0.470 
Founded before 1990 (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.539 0.498 
Foreign ownership (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.075 0.264 
Single establishment firm (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.736 0.441 
Individually-owned establishment (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.281 0.450 
Works council (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.308 0.462 
Export in previous year (1=yes, time-invariant) 0.269 0.443 
Expected business volume development in the current year compared to previous year:     
 Expected to remain constant 0.482 0.500 
 Expected to increase 0.272 0.445 
 Expected to decrease 0.246 0.431 
Industry:     
 Manufacture of food products 0.038 0.192 
 Manufacture of textiles and clothing, tanning and dressing of leather 0.012 0.109 
 Manufacture of paper products, printing, publishing 0.021 0.144 
 Manufacture of wood products 0.019 0.137 
 Manufacture of chemicals, coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.024 0.154 
 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.020 0.139 
 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.020 0.139 
 Manufacture of basic metals 0.024 0.151 
 Recycling 0.004 0.059 
 Manufacture of fabricated metal products and structural metal products 0.042 0.200 
 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.045 0.208 
 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.018 0.132 
 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.008 0.088 
 Manufacture of electrical equipment, office machinery and computers 0.027 0.162 
 Manufacture of precision and optical equipment 0.021 0.142 
 Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, sports goods, games and  
 toys and other products 
0.013 0.113 
 Building of complete constructions or parts 0.049 0.215 
 Building installation and building completion 0.060 0.238 
 Sales, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail service of  
 automotive fuel 
0.039 0.193 
 Wholesale and commission trade 0.052 0.222 
 Retail trade, repair of personal and household goods 0.087 0.282 
 Transport 0.048 0.213 
 Communication 0.004 0.060 
 Central banking 0.007 0.082 
 Insurance and pension funds 0.010 0.100 
 Computer and related activities 0.021 0.145 
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 Research and development 0.008 0.090 
 Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities, advertising, market research 0.038 0.192 
 Real estate activities 0.016 0.126 
 Renting and business activities 0.065 0.246 
 Hotels and restaurants 0.046 0.208 
 Education 0.011 0.104 
 Health, veterinary and social work activities 0.047 0.212 
 Sewage and refusal disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.005 0.072 
 Recreational, cultural, and sporting activities 0.008 0.089 
 Other services 0.025 0.157 
Establishment size:     
 1-9 employees 0.313 0.464 
 10-19 employees 0.145 0.352 
 20-49 employees 0.182 0.386 
 50-249 employees 0.229 0.420 
 250-999 employees 0.100 0.300 
 1000 or more employees 0.030 0.171 
Region:     
 Schleswig-Holstein 0.037 0.190 
 Hamburg 0.029 0.167 
 Niedersachsen 0.069 0.253 
 Bremen 0.057 0.231 
 Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.105 0.306 
 Hessen 0.058 0.233 
 Rheinland-Pfalz 0.045 0.208 
 Baden-Württemberg 0.078 0.269 
 Bayern 0.073 0.260 
 Saarland 0.039 0.194 
 Berlin 0.064 0.244 
 Brandenburg 0.064 0.244 
 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.061 0.240 
 Sachsen 0.082 0.274 
 Sachsen-Anhalt 0.064 0.245 
 Thüringen 0.075 0.264 
Year:     
 2001 0.104 0.305 
 2002 0.104 0.305 
 2003 0.109 0.311 
 2004 0.113 0.317 
 2005 0.118 0.323 
 2006 0.121 0.327 
 2007 0.115 0.319 
 2008 0.123 0.329 
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Appendix Table 2 
Collective Bargaining Coverage (Unweighted Data) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Firm-level 
Agreement  
Coverage 
rate 
7.42 6.97 6.75 6.66 6.94 7.54 8.10 7.43 7.85 
No. estabs. 549 565 519 510 522 561 579 539 555 
Average 
no. 
employees 
318 467 480 436 428 417 470 395 435 
Sector-level 
Agreement  
Coverage 
rate 
50.73 48.95 48.44 46.23 46.01 44.92 42.73 41.90 41.05 
No. estabs. 3,754 3,968 3,725 3,539 3,462 3,341 3,055 3,038 2,901 
Average 
no. 
employees 
314 306 309 282 336 337 329 314 302 
Any Collective 
Agreement 
(Firm- and 
Sector-level 
Agreements)  
Coverage 
rate 
58.15 55.91 55.19 52.89 52.95 52.46 50.83 49.33 48.90 
No. estabs. 4303 4533 4244 4049 3984 3902 3634 3577 3456 
Average 
no. 
employees 
315 326 330 302 348 348 351 327 324 
 N 7,400 8,107 7,690 7,655 7,524 7,438 7,149 7,251 7,067 
 
 
Appendix Table 3 
Transitions into and out of Collective Bargaining, Establishments Observed in Two Consecutive 
Years, Unweighted Data 
 
  2000->01 2001->02 2002->03 2003->04 2004->05 2005->06 2006->07 2007->08 
(a) Sector-level Agreement           
1-->1 2,636 2,704 2,622 2,674 2,638 2,498 2,415 2,382 
1-->0 270 227 200 223 241 260 224 303 
0-->0 2,878 3,177 3,119 3,684 3,885 4,100 4,364 4,836 
0-->1 232 155 158 213 150 138 188 273 
(b) Firm-level Agreement           
1-->1 252 279 256 262 292 300 294 306 
1-->0 168 110 115 121 115 109 152 133 
0-->0 5,481 5,748 5,617 6,291 6,363 6,444 6,629 7,200 
0-->1 115 126 111 120 144 143 116 155 
(c) Any Collective Agreement           
1-->1 3,063 3,165 3,072 3,132 3,148 3,008 2,936 2,870 
1-->0 263 155 121 148 138 159 149 254 
0-->0 2,518 2,844 2,831 3,377 3,552 3,758 4,029 4,424 
0-->1 172 99 75 137 76 71 77 246 
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Appendix Table 4 
Average Real Wages before and after Collective Bargaining Transition, Unweighted Data (Any 
Type of Collective Agreement) 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
(a) 1-->0 (leavers) 
2000 1.089529               
2001   1.126072             
2002     0.9892491           
2003       1.021349         
2004         1.058279 
 
    
2005           1.149984     
2006             1.04605   
2007               0.9948533 
(b) 0-->1 (joiners) 
2000 1.067516               
2001   1.067734             
2002     1.010619           
2003       1.115022         
2004         1.093552       
2005           1.212154     
2006             1.076664   
2007               1.149686 
(c) 1-->1 (always members) 
2000 1.053465               
2001   1.07184             
2002     1.049254           
2003       1.041052         
2004         1.027456       
2005           1.053826     
2006             1.031231   
2007               1.03952 
(d) 0-->0 (never members) 
2000 1.100853               
2001   1.110248             
2002     1.068743           
2003       1.06137         
2004         1.057104       
2005           1.083362     
2006             1.039649   
2007               1.089377 
Note: The reported values are given by           , where     denotes the real wage bill per full-time 
employee in establishment j in year t. 
 
